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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

22 October 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PANEL

SUBJECT: Estimating Soviet Intentions in the Strategic
Weapons Field

NOTE

As Soviet strategic forces approach a size equivalent to that of US forces, Soviet intentions with respect to the future magnitude and character of such forces become a more acute issue for intelligence. This memorandum sets down in a summary way the main considerations which have figured in estimates on this subject. It is intended to provide the basis for a discussion by the panel which hopefully might produce suggestions for new approaches to such estimates.

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say, that they still believe they are involved in an irreconcilable conflict with the "capitalist" world, and in particular with the US as the most formidable non-Communist power. This does not mean that they intend at some time to initiate military action to resolve the conflict in their favor. They say that the historically inevitable revolutionary process will do this for them, but that in the interim they must have a strong defense to thwart the tendency of the desperate "imperialist" rulers to resort to aggression against the "progressive" countries. Even if they genuinely conceive the struggle in mainly political terms, they also believe that if they are seen to possess superior military strength political forces will work more strongly and quickly in their favor. Thus there is no reason to doubt that if they think it within their economic and technical capacity to surpass the US in modern strategic weaponry they will try to do so.

6. Such an aim would not be pursued to the exclusion of other priorities, however. We do not believe that the way to arrive at a view of the USSR's intentions is simply to measure its gross capability to accomplish a single goal. No society operates in this way because the sacrifice of other goals invokes costs and risks which the holders of power will see as

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unacceptable. And an attempt to concentrate all effort on building the largest possible nuclear threat to the US would bring nearer the greatest risk of all, nuclear war itself.

7. Soviet Attitudes Toward Nuclear War. Soviet military writings betray an understandable ambivalence toward nuclear war. Assertions that the USSR could and would prevail are, of course, usual. But one cannot infer from such writings that Soviet leaders really believe that nuclear war could be waged at a tolerable cost and with foreseeable consequences. Despite accusatory rhetoric, it is apparently believed that American leaders also see nuclear war as unacceptable. Yet there as here prudence argues for hedging. The Soviet leaders cannot believe that their state and system would be secure indefinitely if the US held a decisive superiority in strategic weapons. They evidently believe that, since US intentions are hostile the USSR must have forces at least large enough to deter pressures and the possibility of attack in some unforeseeable circumstances. While deterrence could presumably be achieved with forces smaller than those of the US, Soviet military planners will inevitably argue that larger forces will provide more reliable deterrence, and that, moreover, should deterrence fail, etc. Even if the concept of deterrence alone

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governs decisions affecting the size of Soviet forces, the tendency will be, though always in accordance with a judgment of acceptable priority and risk, to maximize and not to minimize the scale of strategic weapons programs.

8. Economic Capability. Clearly there is some reasonable upper limit to the amount of material resources the Soviets are able and willing to apply to strategic weapons programs. Over the last decade, expenditures for all military purposes have been in the range of 7-9 percent of annual GNP. This is a not inconsiderable burden for a country which is still backward in many ways. But if something in the neighborhood of this figure is what the Soviets have thought compatible with their other priorities, including investment for further growth of the economy, then they can presumably continue at such a rate. If they do so, they can make substantial additions to their already large strategic forces without undergoing excessive strain. By 1980, for example, they could triple their force of land-based ICBM's (i.e., to over 3000 missiles) by building launcher facilities at about the same rate of the last few years. More likely, however, they will want to transfer resources to other programs such as missile submarines and perhaps ABM's.

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9. The point is that general economic limitations do not provide a basis for estimating confidently over long time periods and within useful ranges what the size and mix of strategic forces will be. At some point obviously the growing maintenance costs of ever larger forces would dislocate established priorities and become unacceptable. Probably even before this the clamor of non-strategic elements of the armed services to retain their customary share of the military ruble would tend to slow down the growth of strategic forces. Adverse effects on the civilian economy and on living standards would generate other pressures. Nevertheless, economic capability is too rough an estimative tool. For example, it cannot give us the answer to such a key question as whether the SS-9 force will level off at, say 300 launchers, or will grow to twice that size.

10. Technical Capability. We have been aware at various times of failures and lags in certain Soviet weapons programs. The record of Soviet advanced weapons development over the last 20 years or so, however, tells us that generally the Soviets will be able to match our own development work within a few years. Thus we are obliged to say currently that the Soviets can get more accurate ICBM's, can develop a satisfactory MIRV system, and can make the Y-class submarine the equivalent of Polaris. Such

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achievements may sometimes take longer than we estimate, but we cannot assume technical limitations which would set well-defined upper limits to the size and quality of Soviet forces over any long period.

11. Nor can we assume that the Soviets will not be able to make certain technical advances before the US. We say that if these occur they are extremely unlikely to be of a breakthrough character, that is, capable of putting the US at a decisive disadvantage and denying time or possibility for effective counter-measures. In any case, the competition in dynamic advanced technology is in fact a factor which limits our ability to forecast the size and character of Soviet strategic forces.

12. Soviet Requirements. This is an approach which would estimate the future size of Soviet forces on the basis of a calculation of what would be required to cope adequately with US forces and a theoretical target system. There are manifest imprecisions in this method. Over an extended period the US posture is unlikely to remain static. More important, in order to attribute to the Soviet planners a particular requirements calculation it is necessary first to estimate with some exactness

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the inputs they would use -- the accuracy and reliability of Soviet systems, US warning capability and reaction times, the degree of assurance Soviet decision-makers would require. And finally there remains the larger question: requirements for what -- for deterrence at some level of assured destruction or for first strike? In the future, discerning what kind of contingencies the Soviets may be planning for will become even more difficult as the strategic situation is complicated by China's acquisition of nuclear weapons. The ramifications of what might at first blush seem an exact and systematic approach will soon lead the estimator on to soggy ground from which he is very unlikely to issue confident long-range predictions.

13. Historical Patterns. If we look at the record of past strategic weapons programs for clues to future decisions, the indications are inconclusive and contradictory. Deployment of some missile systems and aircraft has been halted at an early stage, presumably because the Soviets decided finally that these weapons were not effective or reliable enough, or that something better was in sight. In other cases (notably MRBM's, IRBM's, and medium bombers) numbers were deployed which exceeded considerably what we would have thought required for the presumed

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mission. In general, we have the impression that when the Soviets develop what they regard as a satisfactory system they are likely to deploy it in a quantity larger than we would think they required. But a vague rule that successful programs tend to be large does not help much to quantify future ones, especially for unproved systems about which we still know little.

14. The Usefulness of Indirect Approaches. What the indirect approaches to long-term estimates of Soviet strategic strength sketched above have in common is that they are often suggestive but never conclusive. They do help us to judge with reasonable confidence the general direction in which Soviet intentions and programs are likely to move. But they do not provide high confidence for estimates of future Soviet force goals within reasonable ranges, nor even for the specific criteria which govern Soviet force planning.

III. Some Concluding Propositions.

15. The Soviets' political outlook, their view of power relations, and their fears and ambitions lead them to desire a significant quantitative and qualitative advantage in strategic

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weaponry. Such an aim will be pursued, however, only within a framework of competing priorities, not as an exclusive or dominating goal.

16. Even if they were able to achieve an advantage, it does not follow that they could or would calculate that the deliberate launching of a nuclear attack on the US could be undertaken within acceptable limits of cost and risk. There is no basis for attributing to them the belief that nuclear war will be winnable in any rational sense in the foreseeable future.

17. Should the Soviets acquire what was seen as a significant margin of advantage in strategic weaponry, however, their policies would probably become more assertive. They might believe that in some critical confrontation such an apparent disparity of power would cause a failure of will on the part of the US or its allies, and permit the USSR to make important gains without war.



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
19. The key judgment for US policy-makers is whether at any given moment developments in Soviet strategic forces are conceivable which would give the USSR a significant advantage before the US could take offsetting measures. On the whole, while intelligence cannot forecast confidently and exactly the size and character of Soviet strategic forces at long range, it is likely, given the size and diversity of US strategic forces, to be able to give sufficiently early warning of such a situation. How much hedging against worst case possibilities is desirable is for national leadership to decide.

THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE NIE
(An Examination of the Theory and Some
Recollections Concerning the Practice of the Art)

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L. Numbering of Estimates	108
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Note to G. R.

1. This essay is to be considered SECRET.
2. Irrespective of random pagination at bottom, upper left, etc., the correct and ruling pagination is that at UPPER RIGHT.
3. I hope that G. R. will look at the footnotes as he goes along, A good many of them are amplifications of the text.
4. NB pp. 108-115 should better come at the end of "Validity Studies" p. 102 and are so placed in this copy.

THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE^{1/}

An Examination of the Theory and Some
Recollections Concerning the Practice of the Art.

I. The Institutional Framework

A. The Director of Central Intelligence and the NIE

1a
The National Intelligence Estimate - spelled thus with capital initial letters - was one of the major innovations of General Walter Bedell Smith, the fourth Director of Central Intelligence whose incumbency bridged the period 7 October 1950 - 24 January 1953.

1a
The title itself proclaims at least two important messages. First, the use of the word "estimate" -- as distinct from "report" or "study" -- shows the Director's concern to emphasize this particular form of intelligence utterance and its importance in his thinking. In this General Smith reflected a similar bent of his deputy, William Harding Jackson, who as an intelligence officer during World War II had had a first hand experience with estimates, had made a deep study of the institution as

practiced ~~by him~~ at high levels of British intelligence, and had himself written the section on national estimating in the Dulles, Jackson, Correa report.^{2/}

Second, the use of the word "national" was employed with equal purpose. It not only designated a type of subject matter suitable for purposes of national security policy formulation, and a hoped-for quality appropriate for use at highest levels of government, but more especially an intelligence production effort which would engage the knowledge and talent of the national intelligence community over which the DCI was the presiding officer.

XXXX

Indeed that thing often referred to as "national intelligence" had been declared to be one of the three principal charges on the DCI. ^{3/} He and he alone was under obligation to produce it. ~~By~~ ^{would} ~~terming~~ the estimates-to-be national ~~was to~~ put them clearly within the larger canopy of "national intelligence" and as such within the personal jurisdiction of the DCI. ⁴

^{Thus} This the first, and by all odds most important, legal and consitutional aspect of the National Intelligence Estimate is that it was and is the Director's estimate, its findings, his. Though many experts perhaps all intelligence components of from the community participated in the production of ~~the~~ ⁸ ~~papers~~ the papers in the NIE series, and though the intelligence chiefs themselves formally passed on the final text, they could not bend its findings to suit their own judgments contrary to the will of the DCI. They could try to win him to their side by full and free discussion, but they could not outvote him and force him to join them, nor could they make him dissent from them, even though they constituted a clear majority of the Intelligence Advisory Board, Intelligence Advisory Committee, or the United States Intelligence Board as it was ^{successively} ~~variously~~ known. By the

same token the DCI could not oblige them to join him in a matter at dispute. They could of their own accord concur with his findings, or not being able to, they could dissent and make their alternative views known in footnotes to his text.

In his very first full dress meeting with his IAC on 20 October 1950 General Smith, forcefully but tactfully, made the matter clear.

5/ The minutes for that historic meeting are gratifyingly full; they contain a verbatim ^{rendering} ~~transcription~~ of a memorandum which General Smith read to his colleagues. ^{5/} He began with the title "The Responsibility ^{i/} of the Central Intelligence Agency for National Intelligence Estimates" and went on to read:

"One of the principal duties assigned to the CIA --- is to ⁴correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and provide for its proper dissemination". The memo goes on to elaborate the intended significance of this phrase from the National Security Act of 1947, and continues: "The CIA is thus given the responsibility of seeing to it that the United States has adequate central machinery for the examination and interpretation of intelligence so that the national security will not

be jeopardized by failure to coordinate the best intelligence opinion in the country, based on all available information."

The logical construction goes on abuilding: Although the National Security Act provided that the departments and agencies of the government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence, it does not limit the duties of the CIA vis-a-vis its intelligence mission except by the standard of national security. In fact, "the Act apparently gives the CIA the independent ~~xxx~~ right of producing national intelligence. As a practical matter [such national intelligence emanating in the form of] estimates can be written only with the collaboration of experts in many fields of intelligence and with the cooperation of several departments and agencies of the government. A national intelligence. . . estimate as assembled and produced by the CIA should reflect the coordination of the best intelligence opinion based on all available information."

The memo went on: The concept of national intelligence estimates underlying the statute is that of an authoritative interpretation and appraisal that will serve as a firm guide to policy makers and planners.

6/ A national intelligence estimate. . . should be compiled and assembled centrally by an agency whose objectivity and disinterestedness are not open to question. "Its ultimate approval should rest upon the collective judgment^{6/} of the highest officials in the various intelligence agencies. Finally, it

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no p6.

on to p7

should command recognition and respect throughout the Government as the best available and presumably the most authoritative estimate.

Although the task is made more difficult by a lack of general acceptance of the concept of national intelligence estimates in the Government, it is, nevertheless, the clear duty and responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency under the statute to assemble and produce such coordinated and authoritative estimates."

The "statute" which General Smith had referred to was, of course, the National Security Act of 1947, notably its section 102, subsection (d), which reads:

(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council--

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where

appropriate existing agencies and facilities

Had General Smith desired he could have given the background to those cryptic and not wholly satisfactory words of section 102 (d), (3). The fact is that President Truman used almost these exact words *phrases* in his letter of 22 January 1946 ~~which he~~ addressed to the Secretaries of State, ~~War~~, and Navy and in which he designated them the so-called National Intelligence Authority and directed them (and a fourth officer to be *by him* named) to plan, develop, and coordinate "all Federal foreign intelligence activities so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security." His letter went on to say that the addressees would assign persons and facilities ~~from~~ from their departments, "which persons shall collectively form a Central Intelligence ^eGroup" under a Director of Central Intelligence, "who shall be designated by me."

The immediately following text says that the new DCI shall:

10/ Accomplish the correlation and evaluation ^{10/} of intelligence relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the

Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence. In so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies of your [i.e. State, War, and Navy] Departments.

11/ A few paragraphs later on the President ordained an Intelligence Advisory Board^{18/} which was the first name given to the body which in General Smith's time was known as the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The letter did not describe the right of Board members to register dissents to decisions of the DCI -- that came soon and in the very first directive which the ^{National Intelligence Authority} ~~NIA~~^{128/} issued.

12/ The President's letter and the NIA directive were given additional strength (~~was~~ perhaps) and precision (certainly) in the first intelligence directive issued by the National Security Council a few months after the passage of the Act which called it into being. Paragraphs ~~4~~ and ~~5~~ of NSCID #1 (12 December 1947) read thus:

13/ 4. The director of Central Intelligence shall produce^{13/} intelligence relating to the national security, hereafter referred to as national

intelligence. In so far as practicable, he shall not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of the various Departments and Agencies but shall make use of existing intelligence facilities and shall utilize departmental intelligence for such production purposes. For definitions see NSCID No. 3.

14/ 5. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate National Intelligence to the President, to members of the National Security Council, to the Intelligence Chiefs of the IAC Agencies, ^{14/} and to such Governmental Departments and Agencies as the National Security Council from time to time may designate. Intelligence so disseminated shall be officially concurred in by the Intelligence Agencies or shall carry an agreed statement of substantial dissent. (emphasis added)

15/ Fast on the heels of this document came NSCID No. 3 (13 January 1948) which reiterated the DCI's ^{15/} duty to produce and disseminate national intelligence, and two of the early DCID's which set forth the Standard Operating Procedures for Departmental

16/ Participation in the Production and Coordination
of National Intelligence ^{16/} and Policy Governing
Departmental Concurrences [and Dissents] in National
17/ Intelligence Reports and Estimates. ^{17/}

on that October day of 1950
In other words when General Smith told his
colleagues of the IAC how he construed his powers under
the National Security Act he could have invoked a
number of other forceful and explicit texts (which
antedated the Act and followed it) to bolster his
position. Of course, he did ^{not} need them, nor did he
need them to support three other decisions which were
essential parts of his new deal for national estimates.

~~II The Office of National Estimates~~
first was his announcement of his formation of
a new office, the Office of National Estimates whose
only concern would be the production of national
estimates and closely related matters. General Smith
set great store by this office and indicated that
"in his opinion it would become the heart of the CIA
and of the national intelligence machinery." ^{18/}

18/ Not revealed in the official minutes, but in a
memo for the record drafted by Col. Hamilton Howze, USA,
an aide to the G-2, who was present at the meeting,
was General Smith's mention of the future Board of
19/ National Estimates. ^{19/} Col. Howze's memo reads:

"9. Within the new Estimates Division of
 [sic] ORE there will be a panel of five or six indi-
 viduals constituting the top brains. General
 Smith is looking hard for a retired General or
 Admiral to head. He tried to get Admiral [Leslie]
 Stevens (recent Naval Attaché, Moscow) and
 asked Admiral Johnson [Felix Johnson, the DNI]
 to talk once more to Stevens in an effort to
 persuade him. General Smith also said he was
 anxious to get [redacted]
 to be a member of the panel, and possibly to
 head the Division."

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Be it said that General Smith did not get the services
 of Leslie Stevens nor did he put [redacted] in
 charge of the new office. [redacted] did accept a place
 on the Board and the distinguished Harvard historian,
 William L. Langer, became its first chairman.) With
 this sort of official announcement the ~~ORE~~ ^{ONE} with its
 own administrative machinery was off to an auspicious
 start.

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Second, the National Intelligence Estimate would
 be known as just that, not an "ORE" with a number,
 nor yet an "ONE," nor a "CIA" for that matter. It
 "would be published under a cover showing plainly

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20/
that the estimate was a collective effort the result of which would be labeled as a national intelligence estimate." ^{20 21/}

21/
Third, General Smith indicated his intention of holding IAC meetings "more often and for longer periods although as chairman, he would make every effort to keep the meetings as brief as possible. He stated that the IAC must be geared for rapid cooperative work." ^{21/}

In this he was true to his promise; the IAC began meeting regularly (and once a week) with the DCI seldom absent from the chair. As the NIE's moved into production, NIE business - whether the laying on, the clearing of scope notes, or pronouncing upon a finished product - became a staple of IAC fare. This was of course in marked contrast to the Hillenkoetter regime where IAC meetings were rarely called and when called, never to participate in any phase of the pre-Smith brand of national estimates.

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At this first IAC meeting there was another piece of NIE business which was not exactly an innovation. It was in large measure a reminder of the production procedures which had first appeared two years earlier in General Smith's

22/
restatement of these procedures was official notice of ^{22/} his desire to have things done according to the book.

Perhaps to maintain the momentum which he had already given to the NIE, General Smith ended by calling for another meeting ⁱⁿ five days ~~hence~~ to discuss "national estimates priorities and the frame of reference ^{23/} and assumptions to form the basis of an intelligence estimate of the situation in Indo-China."

In his rendering of the established procedures for doing NIE's General Smith added something new and important to the constitutional law. It was the content of his first sentence (paragraph ^{"8/a"} in the Minutes): "The Intelligence Advisory Committee will adopt an intelligence plan, or more specifically, a list of required national estimates in an order of priority."

With this came into being two significant [#] developments. The first had to do with the initiation of the NIE's.

Henceforward NIE's would be formally initiated by IAC action. Requests could come in from many quarters and did: a few times from the President himself, often from the members of the NSC (especially from the Secretary of Defense in Mr. McNamara's time) often from the second echelon in the departments of State and Defense, from the DCI, IAC members, from the Board of National Estimates and others. Such requests were usually referred to the BNE in the first instance, which would put the item on the agenda of the next IAC meeting or get an IAC authorization by phone if time pressed. Upon occasion when a request came in which was clearly not a suitable topic for the NIE treatment (something more akin to a National Intelligence Survey or a research study) the chairman of the BNE would try to deflect it to another component of the CIA. Failing this, the chairman of the BNE was bound to take the request to the IAC and try to make his case there for declining the honor. The point is, of course, that actual initiation of an NIE which would engage the talents of perhaps scores of people throughout the community was the decision for the community's highest body, the IAC, or after it, the USIB.

The second institution General Smith set in motion was that of planning the program of NIE's to

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on the Board and suggesting pointedly that they begin to share the wealth. *burden.*

II The Office of National Estimates

From this time forward until 1 November 1973 the Office of National Estimates, ~~established by directorial design~~ acted as the Director's executive agent for the acquittal of his responsibility for the production and dissemination of national intelligence estimates. One may date the Office's formal legal beginnings from the appointment of its chief, [redacted] (13 November 1950) ~~[whose proper title was Assistant Director, National Estimates (AD/NE). He was also the chairman of the Board of National Estimates.]~~ In these days before the creation of the Office of the Deputy Director/Intelligence, the AD/NE (along with five other AD's of the so-called overt offices) reported to the Director through this deputy (the DDCI).

[redacted] mission and functions was spelled out in "CIA Regulation No. 70" of 1 December 1950. With the exception of one of its paragraphs this document described the duties which he, his successors, and the office they presided over followed in guiding the procreation of ~~some~~ ^{more than} 1500 National Intelligence Estimates over 23 years. The paragraph which became

28/ inapplicable was #6 which had assigned to the AD/NE the current intelligence task and the issuance of the Daily Summary. In a matter of a few weeks, [] had disengaged from this responsibility to concentrate his resources on the main task of the estimates. 28/

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The Office of National Estimates took shape speedily. It should be viewed as consisting of three components: the Board of National Estimates, the professional staff, and the support staff.

The Board was the principal departure from what had gone before. In the thinking of General Smith and Mr. Jackson, the Board was to consist of an indeterminate number of senior officers (say more than five and less than twelve), who came from a variety of professional backgrounds, and who, paid handsomely in the supergrade categories, had, (contrary to normal civil service practice) no administrative duties whatever. Their task was wholly substantive. Their days were spent in individual and more often collective efforts on every aspect of the estimates. They met first thing in the morning to hear the day's news and perhaps discuss it in terms of NIE's in the works or to come; they met again often with the ONE staff, often with representatives of the IAC agencies to talk about the schedule, to produce terms of reference,

to review drafts, and to arrive at duly coordinated texts suitable to present to the Director and the IAC. They invited and listened to ambassadors, officers of the foreign aid program, attachés, members of the numerous military assistance groups (MAG, later MAAG), CIA officers in from the field, and many others. Above all they studied the new intelligence. Each day their reading room received a wide spectrum of the daily take which ranged from routine items like the [] reports, CIA, attaché, and State Department cables to the most sensitive materials that lay in the arcane code-word areas on the far side of Top Secret (SI, RD, TKH to name the obvious). This was the daily grist for thought and discussion. Indeed almost as much as the labor on the draft estimates the reading of the highly privileged news made its contribution to the collegial nature of the Board. And it was this very group effort that so often resulted in the posing of the right questions and the struggling for the best answers. As one Board member has pointed out the collegial spirit also made its contribution to a finished product of high quality. There was always, he remarks, one or two colleagues who had not been so immersed in a paper to be bored with it and willing to let it go forward irrespective of flaws. Seemingly there was almost always one of these fresh

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brethren
~~colleagues~~

who stepped in as a potent "no" man.

At the start, the Board consisted of Mr. Langer,
myself who was named his deputy early in 1951, [redacted]

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[redacted]
(General Smith here deferred to his own background
and the important role of the military in the intelligence
community), [redacted] (a Boston lawyer nominated
by Mr. Jackson) [redacted]

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(Mr. [redacted] choices: two outstanding professors of
modern history and economics respectively), and

[redacted] Ludwell Montague (senior officers
of CIA's Office of Reports and Estimates [ORE]). The
latter two, who had had many years of intelligence
experience including three or four as estimators in
ORE, brought with them a high competence for the task,

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and a rich first hand knowledge of the grandeurs and miseries of coordinating speculative intelligence at the national level.

Along with [redacted] Montague

ONE inherited a much broader legacy from ORE. Most obviously, we recruited our full staff, both the professional and support components from ORE. Let me speak of the professionals first. ^{28a} ~~In the beginning there were about 25 of them. Two decades later a few more than 30.~~ Most if not all of them had had graduate school work in history or the social sciences, most if not all had served in wartime intelligence work (with one of the military intelligence organizations or OSS). They had improved their regional or functional competences in their duties with CIA. They also, like [redacted] Montague, knew a lot about the post-war intelligence community, its strengths and weaknesses, and how to do business with it. They set a pace for a quality of workmanship that we were able to maintain during the lifetime of the ONE office. For twenty years they were the best staff in town and so proclaimed by a good number of very knowledgeable outsiders. ²⁹

The support staff also recruited from ORE was made up of about the same number of skillful ~~men and~~ women (growing eventually to about 35) who controlled the distributing of the daily flood of in-coming intelligence materials, ran the ONE library, did the general

secretarial work for the Board and the professional staffs, and attended to the reproduction in multiple copies of the endless stream of NIE's in every stage of their creation, first, second, third, and nth draft right up to the final manuscript for dispatch to the printer. The capabilities of our little *Reproduction* staff was a nine-days wonder throughout the community's band of estimators.

Thus the ONE at the ^bbeginning owed much to what ~~had been~~ had gone before. ^fIf all of us in the office had been newcomers like the members of the Board and ^{had} if all of us [^]had to learn the complicated trade from scratch our fast start and speedy accomplishment would not have been.

With time there were great changes in the manning of ~~XXXX~~ both Board and staff. We were careful about replacements and maintained the standards of excellence. One thing greatly in our favor was a refusal ~~by~~ to try to build an empire and ^{to} sketch our table of organization to imperial dimensions. In the beginning our T/O was set at 85, a figure we never reached. For 1951 we had a fewer than 60 people aboard. Ten years later with a considerably larger work load we reached a total of ^{Something under} about 70, perhaps a dozen of whom were on the Board. Some of the latter were

of our staff or other CIA staffs whom the Director raised to Board status.

The original concept was that Board members should be "generalists" without specialized expertise in, or estimative responsibility for, particular geographic or functional areas. Over the years, certain specialization began to emerge informally. A Board member by virtue of being assigned to chair a succession of papers on a particular area, or by reason of his own growing interest and study, would become more knowledgeable than his colleagues about a particular problem or part of the world.

Furthermore, as members of the staff, which was organized on a regional basis, began to become members of the Board, they of course brought with them the more profound knowledge of the areas to which they had been assigned. Papers on "their" areas were more often than not given to them to shepherd through the trials of examination by the Board and ~~a~~ coordination with the Reps. Thus, without any very conscious plan, a sort of specialization developed within the Board. This had the notable advantage of ^aenabling the Board member so qualified to be more useful in the various stages of drafting and coordination.

SECRET

Some anomalies developed, for example, Middle East specialists from the staff were appointed to the Board in numbers out of proportion to the other area ~~experts~~ experts so that, to the extent Board members were admitted to have specialties, we were over-endowed with Middle Easterners. But the unsystematic system worked pretty well. The chairman of a paper would see to it that a couple of his colleagues would follow its development closely enough to be able to lend a hand if trouble developed in a Reps' meeting, and most of the other Board members would have had their say before then.

Later, ^(in 1968) when Abbot Smith took over as head of the ONE with John Huizenga as his deputy, a more formal effort at specialization was launched. Board panels were established, each responsible for a particular area, and each with a Board member in charge, with two of his colleagues also assigned. This was well enough, but there was a corollary: Board members were at least tacitly discouraged from concerning themselves with the doings of a panel to which they were not assigned. Doubtless this saved time in the Board consideration of an estimate, but it also narrowed the range of inspection to which an estimate was subjected.

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In this situation, the views of a panel chairman sometimes came to have inordinate weight.

The Representatives of the Other
Intelligence Agencies

With the beginning of the ONE came a marked change in the manner of coordinating estimates with the other members of the intelligence community.

[go to p. 35]

In the days of ONE's precessor (CIA's Office of Reports and Estimates) man to man contact between ORE analysts and their opposite numbers in the community had been irregular. A good deal of the coordination of estimates had been achieved via a challenge and response ballet conducted in ~~xxx~~ writing. ORE would initiate an estimate and request contributions. Not receiveing ^{adequate help} ~~an~~ ^{on whatever resources it could command} ORE would draft the paper and send it out for comment. When the comment was given it was given in written form. ORE would attempt to conform its text to well-founded exceptions and forget the rest. It would circulate the paper once more -- this time for concurrence or dissent. Throughout the bulk of the transaction was conducted by memo.

~~General Smith asked~~ ^{to serve}
 When Ludwell Montague was ~~told off~~ as the CIA officer to coordinate a number of NIE's, ^{and in a great hurry} ~~he established~~ ^(insisted upon) a man-to-man contact with his opposite numbers in the IAC agencies. Thus ^{Montague} ~~he~~ was able to get a far higher degree of helpful compliance than heretofore. The six papers which he shepherded were thrashed out around

a table with living representatives of the four principal intelligence services (State and the three military services).

7 By the time I had entered on duty in late November ⁽¹⁹⁵⁰⁾ the meeting of representatives (the Reps) to coordinate a text was a going institution. Throughout the history of the NIE, between 1950 and 197³ ~~as I can remember~~ ^{where} ~~writing to~~, the Reps ~~have been~~ one of the two or three elements which made the whole enterprise a success, ~~may~~ ~~one should say possible.~~

A word about the Reps: IAC members perceiving that the NIE was a deathly serious undertaking by General Smith, and cheerful at the way the account was being handled, gave ready support. Of their officers, ^{continued} they ~~seem to have~~ designated one who ~~was~~ would be their principal staff operative for the NIE account. ^{as ORE before us,} ~~We came to~~ recognize these officers as the IAC Senior Representatives. They were the ONE's first point of contact within the IAC agencies for all business affecting the NIE.

Below each of these Senior Reps was a pool of intelligence officers most of whose duties ^{included} ~~lay in~~ the area of the NIE. They were usually experienced men and women with a regional or functional specialty and an ability to discuss the substance and the rhetoric of draft estimates. They ^{attended the meetings.} ~~were the meeting-attenders.~~

where text was coordinated and where agreement was achieved when possible. They were the people who when agreement was not possible, were the articulators of tentative dissent.

The institution of the Reps, which had had its informal beginnings in the ORE days flourished ~~highly~~ ^{schedule 7} with the coming of the ONE and its heavy ~~commitment~~ ^{to the} NIE's. Its existence rested solidly upon the stuff of the customary law. I can so assert because there ^e is no reference to "Representatives" in [] (8 July 1946) devoted to the standard procedures of national intelligence production nor, of course, in [] of 13 September 1948 devoted to concurrences in national intelligence. In General Smith's rough outline of procedures, there are references to "discussion" between "ORE, or. . . the ONE when it is established" . . . and the several intelligence agencies," but no word of "Representatives." However all NIE's produced from that point on involved the Reps in one way or another. It was not until the issuance of [] of 1 Sept 1953 (which superseded [] cited above) that the word "Representatives" (and the institution) passed from the customary to the statute law. Paragraph 3(c) reads:

Consideration by Representatives of the IAC Agencies. -- Representatives of the IAC Agencies will meet with the Board to review, comment on and revise the draft as necessary. ^{30/}

Of the scores or even hundreds of Reps that we encountered two things may be said: (1) They were indispensable to the production of NIE's, and (2) there was no other uniformity. Some were skilled intelligence professionals; others were unhappy time-servers; most fell between these poles. I will have more to say about ^{them} ~~the Reps~~ in a later section.

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SECRET (When Filled In)

AREA OR COUNTRY(S)	ORGANIZATIONS	FUNCTIONS & TOPICS	PERSONALITIES	DOCUMENT
HQ 1/	IAC Navy	Minutes		DATE: 20 Oct 1950
	State ORE	Estimates		
	Army AEC	Senior Reps.		
	Air Force			CLASS: S
	JCS			NO. 1
	FBI			
IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT (author, form, addressee, title & length)				LOCATION:
Minutes of IAC Meeting held 20 Oct 1950 8 Pages with 2 pages of notes and list of those present				HS/HC- 266
ABSTRACT				
<p>The agenda of this meeting was "Policies and Procedures of the Intelligence Advisory Committee." The attached notes are by Colonel HOWZE of the Dept. of Army.</p>				
(These notes are from ICAPS file, RC Job No. 67-59, folder 1)				
FORM 2523 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS		HISTORICAL STAFF SOURCE INDEX		SECRET (12-13)

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